
(Matthew Taylor, Chief Executive of the Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce)
As stated in the Council of Trent, “[T]here is a purgatory […] and that the souls therein are aided by the suffrages of the faithful and chiefly by the acceptable sacrifice of the altar.”[1] In this view “’Hades’ applies to everyone in the period between death and resurrection. But this state contains “various levels of happiness and unhappiness,” which correspond to the different levels of justification and sanctification of the faithful on earth.”[2]
The Reformers reject purgatory because of the confidence in the efficacy and sufficiency of Christ’s atoning work that eliminate any intermediate state cleansing of those who are already in him (Gal. 3.1-14, Eph. 2.8-9, Heb. 9.11-15). So even if Protestants affirm the reference to the Maccabean literature as canonical, our Christology—following that of the authors of Galatians, Ephesians and Hebrews—is enough to fulfil the Maccabean’s rites, making it irrelevant under the new covenant. However, Roman Catholic theologians like Joseph Ratzinger fail to grasp the overwhelming-ness of the Reformers’ Christology. And often they do that with a bit of irony.[3]
[1] As quoted in Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology (USA: Catholic University of America Press, 1988), p.220.
[2] Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology (USA: Catholic University of America Press, 1988), p.228. Emphasis added.
[3] Ironically, Ratzinger thought that the Reformers’ Christology is weak because Christ’s atoning work cannot be extended into the after life. He wrote, “Given [the Reformers’] doctrine of justification, they were unable to concede that there might be atonement in the life to come.” (Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology [USA: Catholic University of America Press, 1988], p.219). Yet if Christ’s atoning measure is effective not through gradualness or repetition but “once for all” (Hebrew 9.26-28), who needs to extend it to the after life?
"Governments led the population into believing that economic growth was sustainable and gave the impression that risk had been abolished. And households were by no means obliged to take on so much debt, which for many led to catastrophe.
The church has a clear responsibility to offer a culture that offers an alternative to mere consumption.
We must show our neighbours that the desire for more should be tempered by long-term individual interests, wider social needs, environmental concerns and a focus on saving rather than borrowing.
Banks and governments are often hailed as holding the answers to all our problems. But a biblical analysis of the current situation implies that all of us have a responsibility.
We must recognise the idolatry in our economic system and condemn the structural injustices it generates.
The aims of economics – wealth, consumption, power – stand in stark contrast to Jesus’ proclamation of the kingdom of God: the law of love for God and neighbour and responsible stewardship.
The church should proclaim this vigorously."
"I think, firstly, it is clear to me that businesses have that responsibility which we were just talking about: to think about how their activities contribute to the common good.
Now they got to be profitable, they are not charity. They job is to grow the business profitably. But they need to think about that on a sustainable basis.
Sustainability means not the next quarter, maximizing quarter by quarter. It means thinking about a sustainable business model that earns profit, that earns a return on the capital that are entrusted to them by their shareholders.
And if you think about that in a long term perspective, that takes you into think about the engagement of your people and on a long term commitment to the business. It also very importantly takes you into the question of the social responsibility of the company. And corporate social responsibility often actually becomes a buzzword which is a problem. And it certainly often been talked about as though it is an adjunct to the rule of business of the company: "That will keep the activist off my back." Well no, actually that's the raison d'être (reason for being) of the business.
So thinking about the social responsibility of the business is not at all inconsistent with long term profitable development of the business model. Not at all. On the contrary, these things are interdependent. So that's for the businesses, and it creates a board level and a senior management level to be thinking about the specific implication of that.
The onus to government. One of the characteristic of market fundamentalism in its extreme form anyway is the belief that the market is self-policing; the more it is left alone, the more better everybody will be. Well, I don't think that is ever true. And certainly the current crisis has told us that's not true.
The fact is that the market is not, and we know it and anybody who has a longer term perspective of history will know it, the markets are not self-policing. They are not self-stabilizing. You need governmental oversight. You need an appropriate regulation. There are all sorts of wrong way to do regulation of course. But there is no sense in my view that you can run complex modern economy in complex modern market without a fairly extensive and carefully calibrated governmental involvement. So absolutely governments have a role, so do businesses and so, of course, the individuals."

"Our moral instincts are immune to the explicitly articulated commandments handed down by religions and government." (p.xviii)The author of the book Moral Minds is the Professor of Psychology, Organismic & Evolutionary Biology and Biological Anthropology at Harvard University. He is now in trouble. It has been found out that Hauser has eight misconducts in his research work.
"I will argue that this marriage between morality and religion is not only forced but unnecessary, crying out for a divorce."
(Marc Hauser, Moral Minds [USA: HarperCollins, 2006], p.xx)
"It was one experiment in particular that led members of Mr. Hauser's lab to become suspicious of his research and, in the end, to report their concerns about the professor to Harvard administrators.Hauser's case might create a ripple effect across the scientific community as there are other scientists whose work made reference to his findings.
The experiment tested the ability of rhesus monkeys to recognize sound patterns. Researchers played a series of three tones (in a pattern like A-B-A) over a sound system. After establishing the pattern, they would vary it (for instance, A-B-B) and see whether the monkeys were aware of the change. If a monkey looked at the speaker, this was taken as an indication that a difference was noticed.
The method has been used in experiments on primates and human infants. Mr. Hauser has long worked on studies that seemed to show that primates, like rhesus monkeys or cotton-top tamarins, can recognize patterns as well as human infants do. Such pattern recognition is thought to be a component of language acquisition.
Researchers watched videotapes of the experiments and "coded" the results, meaning that they wrote down how the monkeys reacted. As was common practice, two researchers independently coded the results so that their findings could later be compared to eliminate errors or bias.
According to the document that was provided to The Chronicle, the experiment in question was coded by Mr. Hauser and a research assistant in his laboratory. A second research assistant was asked by Mr. Hauser to analyze the results. When the second research assistant analyzed the first research assistant's codes, he found that the monkeys didn't seem to notice the change in pattern. In fact, they looked at the speaker more often when the pattern was the same. In other words, the experiment was a bust.
But Mr. Hauser's coding showed something else entirely: He found that the monkeys did notice the change in pattern—and, according to his numbers, the results were statistically significant. If his coding was right, the experiment was a big success.
The second research assistant was bothered by the discrepancy. How could two researchers watching the same videotapes arrive at such different conclusions? He suggested to Mr. Hauser that a third researcher should code the results. In an e-mail message to Mr. Hauser, a copy of which was provided to The Chronicle, the research assistant who analyzed the numbers explained his concern. "I don't feel comfortable analyzing results/publishing data with that kind of skew until we can verify that with a third coder," he wrote.
A graduate student agreed with the research assistant and joined him in pressing Mr. Hauser to allow the results to be checked, the document given to The Chronicle indicates. But Mr. Hauser resisted, repeatedly arguing against having a third researcher code the videotapes and writing that they should simply go with the data as he had already coded it. After several back-and-forths, it became plain that the professor was annoyed.
"i am getting a bit pissed here," Mr. Hauser wrote in an e-mail to one research assistant. "there were no inconsistencies! let me repeat what happened. i coded everything. then [a research assistant] coded all the trials highlighted in yellow. we only had one trial that didn't agree. i then mistakenly told [another research assistant] to look at column B when he should have looked at column D. ... we need to resolve this because i am not sure why we are going in circles."
The research assistant who analyzed the data and the graduate student decided to review the tapes themselves, without Mr. Hauser's permission, the document says. They each coded the results independently. Their findings concurred with the conclusion that the experiment had failed: The monkeys didn't appear to react to the change in patterns.
They then reviewed Mr. Hauser's coding and, according to the research assistant's statement, discovered that what he had written down bore little relation to what they had actually observed on the videotapes. He would, for instance, mark that a monkey had turned its head when the monkey didn't so much as flinch. It wasn't simply a case of differing interpretations, they believed: His data were just completely wrong.
As word of the problem with the experiment spread, several other lab members revealed they had had similar run-ins with Mr. Hauser, the former research assistant says. This wasn't the first time something like this had happened. There was, several researchers in the lab believed, a pattern in which Mr. Hauser reported false data and then insisted that it be used.
They brought their evidence to the university's ombudsman and, later, to the dean's office. This set in motion an investigation that would lead to Mr. Hauser's lab being raided by the university in the fall of 2007 to collect evidence. It wasn't until this year, however, that the investigation was completed. It found problems with at least three papers. Because Mr. Hauser has received federal grant money, the report has most likely been turned over to the Office of Research Integrity at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services."
"Faith is the great cop-out, the great excuse to evade the need to think and evaluate evidence. Faith is belief in spite of, even perhaps because of, the lack of evidence."Such rhetorics are popular. Those who adopt it think that it is sensible. But as I've tried to show in this and previous post, our ability and strive to make sense are fundamentally a step of faith.
(Richard Dawkins, Untitled Lecture, Edinburgh Science Festival, 1992)
"The meme for blind faith secures its own perpetuation by the simply unconscious expedient of discouraging rational inquiry."
Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene [UK: Oxford University Press, 30th anniversay edition, 2006], p.198)
"I don't know; I must believe."
(Jacques Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind [USA: University of Chicago Press, 1993], p. 155. Emphasis added.)
"Commenting on Richard Dawkin's book The God Delusion, which strikes many of the same notes as Harris's books, fellow atheist Michael Ruse, professor of philosophy at Florida State University, says, "The God Delusion makes me embarrassed to be an atheist." And in response to Sam Harris's presentation at the Salk Institute, atheist and professor of psychology Scott Atran used almost identical words: "I find it fascinating that among the brilliant scientists and philosophers at the conference, there was no convincing evidence presented that they know how to deal with the basic irrationality of human life other than to insist against all reason and evidence that things ought to be rational and evidence based. It makes me embarassed to be a scientist and atheist."
(Ravi Zacharias, The End of Reason: A Response to the New Atheists [USA: Zondervan, 2008], p.23)
"...atheism turns out to be too simple. If the whole universe has no meaning, we should never have found out that it has no meaning: just as, if there were no light in the universe and therefore no creatures with eyes, we should never know it was dark. Dark would be a word without meaning."What convinces me to believe in the existent of God?
(C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity)
"[Jesus] envisages a transnational and transcultural community that is not identified with any one state, he anticipates the obligation to give to the Caesar that is in power whatever is his due.This observation on Islam by the Research Professor of the New Testament at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School coheres well with that of Dominique Colas, a Professor of Political Science at Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris:
[...] Certainly this utterance of the Lord Jesus has been one of the roots, though not the only one, of long-standing and constantly evolving tensions between the church and the state across the centuries. Moreover, this way of looking at things is one of the most important features that differentiates Christianity and Islam. Islam has no body of tradition that enables it to distinguish between church and state. [...] the state's role, finally, is to bow to the law of Allah."
(D. A. Carson, Christ and Culture Revisited [UK: Apollos, 2008]. p.57)
"Whereas Christianity developed on the periphery of the Roman Empire and little by little conquered the center--this initial exteriority followed by a fusion with Caesar was continually repeated in the Christian West, where the distance between church and state came first, and the state would take its revenge on the Caesaro-papist arrangement by enabling the secular autonomy of civil society--the political construction of the state in the Middle East and North Africa followed a model of conquest involving the importation of a faith, a language--Arabic--and organization into caliphates. "This state," affirmed Bernard Lewis, "was defined by Islam, and full membership belonged, alone, to those professed the dominant faith." It is not then Islam itself but the conditions of its expansion that explain the absence of differentiation between civil society and the state."Carson locates Islam's heritage widely as "tradition". Colas locates it to Islam's history of "propagation" (p.97). This explains why Muslims generally are still advocating to place the authority of Syariah on the same par as civil law, and so creating problems to various multicultural societies. A case in point is of course Malaysia.
(Dominique Colas, Civil Society and Fanaticism: Conjoined Histories [USA: Stanford University Press, 1997], p.97-98)
"For the Christian to undertake scholarship is to undertake a course of action that may lead him into the painful process of revising his actual Christian commitment, sorting through his beliefs, and discarding some from a position where they can any longer function as control. It may, indeed, even lead him to a point where his authentic commitment has undergone change. We are all profoundly historical creatures."Being historical means that none of our learning is final as all of it are subjected to the constraint of history, and so non-objective. It is not only the process of continuous investigation and revising that is painful. The fact that knowing the absolute tentativeness of one's current knowledge and belief is very very unsettling.
(Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion [USA: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1976; Second edition, 1984], p.96-97. Emphasis original.)
"I was mesmerized for one semester by the boldness of Van Til’s thinking, but by the second semester I began to suspect that he was stretching a defensible theory of knowledge to the borders of absurdity. If true, it would mean that unless any two people had correct beliefs about God and about the world they could not have a genuine conversation about anything. How can two people talk respectfully together about interesting parts of reality — the economy, for instance, or the possibility of life on Mars — if one of them assumes that everything the other person says about anything is doomed to be dead wrong?Just yesterday, a collegemate (whose email address bears the label "vantilian") told me that he recently bought two of Van Til's books. One being his famous work on apologetic 'The Defense of the Faith', while the other one on Barth. I did not ask my vantilian collegemate whether was it 'Christianity and Barthianism' or 'New Modernism'. If Van Til can't even allow Barth to be Barth without reading himself into Barth, as Smedes has so willingly pointed out, then one is left to wonder how reliable is Van Til's understanding of Barth?
Van Til was convinced that if anyone’s assumptions about God are wrong, she cannot be trusted even when she says that she believes the gospel truth about Jesus. He wrote a book called The New Modernism in which he contended that the star theologian of the century, Karl Barth, was a modernist because, in Van Til’s view, he denied that Jesus was God in human form and denied as well that he had risen from the dead. The hitch was that Barth had affirmed these things over and over and, in fact, was largely to be credited with bringing the gospel back into the churches of Europe. But Van Til said that even if Barth shouted from the tower of St. Peter’s that Jesus was the Son of God, he could not believe what he was saying. His philosophical presuppositions would not let him.
Several years later, after I had finished my graduate studies in Amsterdam, I had occasion to put the question to Barth himself: “Sir, if you will permit me an absurd anachronism, let us suppose that a journalist carried a camera into Jesus’ tomb about eight o’clock on Easter Sunday morning and took pictures of every inch of the tomb, what would have showed up on his film?” Barth sighed. This again? He had been asked questions like this by every skeptical evangelical who got within shouting distance of him. But he was patient: “He would have gotten nothing but pictures of an empty tomb. Jesus was not there. He had walked out of the tomb early that morning.”
I told Van Til about this conversation. His answer was, for me, a final exhibition of intellectual futility. “Smedes,” he said, “you have studied philosophy, you should know that Barth cannot believe that Jesus rose from the dead.” Cannot! Not merely does not, but cannot believe what he said he believed. Conversation finished."
"A significant group of scholars working in the field of "early Barth" research have concluded that Kierkegaard's contribution, while not insignificant, was of much more limited value than was once thought. [...] [T]he influence of Heinrich Barth and Franz Overbeck was more important than that of the Danish philosopher. Kierkegaard's role was limited to strengthening Barth's commitment to certain modes of thought whose real origin lay in the influence of the distinctive form of neo-Kantianism elaborated by Barth's philosopher brother Heinrich in the years immediately following the way, and to providing him with a number of categories which (once they had been transformed for Barth's strictly theological purposes!) could be employed in clarifying a point of view which would, for the most part, have been complete without them."
(Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development 1909-1936 [UK: Oxford University Press, 1995], p.217)
If you run a bookshop, where would you shelve James Dunn's latest book 'Did the first Christians worship Jesus?'?"...the classic creedal distinction between different 'persons' of the Godhead, when 'person' is understood in its everyday sense, invites the perception of God in tri-theistic rather than Trinitarian terms, as three and distinct individual 'persons'. In view of this, it may be helpful to look back to the beginning of the process that resulted in the formulation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and in doing so to clarify what lay behind the confession of Jesus as the Son of God in Trinitarian terms...If one has read through the book, one would not miss the final part where Dunn emphasizes that the Jesus, as perceived by first Christians, is one that neither Muslims and Judaic Jews able to accept, and hence uniquely Christian, uniquely Trinitarian,
...a more fruitful way forward would be to inquire behind the process that has given Christianity its creedal confessions, to attempt some closer examination of the beginning of the process [of Christians worshiping Jesus as God]. (Emphasis added, p.1-2)
"...Christianity has gone further in declaring that God has bridged the gulf [between the divine and human] not merely in scripture and temple, not only through priest and prophet, but in a particular individual whom God revealed himself and who constitutes the bridge over the gulf in himself. That claim remains a claim too far for Jews and Muslims. But the claim that Christians make is that the character of God has never been revealed so fully and profoundly as in Jesus--in his mission, in his cruel death on the cross, and in his resurrection and exaltation. It is because Jesus died as he did that Christians find it necessary to speak of the God who suffers, even of 'the crucified God'. (Emphasis added, p.150)To miss all these is to misread Dunn's work. No where in Dunn's work "takes issue with the great christological statements of the councils of Nicea" as the Muslim reviewer alleges.
"To clasp the hands in prayer is the beginning of an uprising against the disorder of the world."
(Karl Barth, The Christian Life: Church Dogmatics IV.4)